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According to Becker’s human capital theory, employers tend to under-invest in general 
training relative to specific training as it increases their existing employees’ outside 
opportunities.  We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information 
gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills.  An example is the training of 
new hires.  When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and 
the agent, the principal may over-invest in general training relative to specific training. 
General training helps the principal reduce the incentive problem inside the firm.   
Becker’s result of under-investment in general training may not hold when training 
creates asymmetric information. (JEL: D82, D83, J31, L22) 
   1
1. Introduction 
In many situations, an agent who engages in certain activities sponsored by a 
principal can gather critical information as a byproduct.  An example is the training for 
new hires.  As new hires are often inexperienced, they may not know their abilities or 
skills yet.  By participating in a training program sponsored by the employer (principal), 
newly-hired workers (agents) can learn their abilities or skills.
1  If this information is 
revealed to the worker only, an incentive problem arises due to the information 
asymmetry.  In this paper, we examine how a principal decides his investment in training 
taking into account this incentive problem.  In particular, we compare the principal’s 
willingness to invest in general versus specific training. 
It is a well-known result in the literature (BECKER [1964]) that firms are generally 
reluctant to invest in general training.  The reason is that general training increases the 
human capital useful outside the firm and a newly-trained agent is able to promptly 
leverage the higher outside opportunities provided by general training.  However, 
contrary to this view, recent empirical studies find evidence that firms do sponsor general 
training to a broad extent, particularly for young workers, new hires, and apprentices.  
For instance, Germany has a well-documented institutionalized apprenticeship system 
where workers receive a training that is largely general and whose cost is mostly paid by 
employers (HARHOFF AND KANE [1997] and ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE [1998]).  Similar 
evidence exists in other countries: e.g., see BOOTH AND BRYAN [2007] for the U.K. or 
GERFIN [2004] for Switzerland.  In the U.S., LOWENSTEIN AND SPLETZER [1998] also 
report that employers mostly pay for general training without passing on the cost to 
workers in the form of lower wages.  The BLS’ National Compensation survey of 2007 
shows that assistance for general education is provided by 15% of firms (23% for firms 
of more than 100 employees).  
This evidence has prompted a renewed theoretical interest in Becker’s work.  For 
firm-sponsored general training to be profitable, theoretical studies point to the necessity 
of labor market frictions and suggest several sources of frictions including information 
asymmetry between incumbent and potential employers in addition to imperfect labor 
market competition.
2   Synthesizing these studies, ACEMOGLU AND P ISCHKE [1999] 
conclude that wage compression associated with labor market frictions allows firms to 
sponsor general training.  More recently, KESSLER AND LÜLFESMANN [2006] show that 
even without labor market frictions general training can be profitable due to an incentive 
complementarity with specific training. 
In this paper, we do not address the issue of how general training is profitable.  
We just take ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE’s [1999] results as given and simply assume that 
general training can be profitable for the principal due to labor market frictions.  We then 
investigate the conditions under which general training can be more profitable for the 
principal than specific training.  At first glance, such situation cannot happen.  The reason 
                                                 
1 There are many other examples of this situation: for instance, when a firm invests in R&D, researchers 
acquire information about a new technology; or when a seller provides free samples, seminars and product 
demonstrations, buyers learn their preference over the product. 
2 See  KATZ AND Z IDERMAN [1990], CHAND AND W ANG [1996], ACEMOGLU  AND P ISCHKE [1998] for 
asymmetric information between incumbent and potential employers, and STEVENS [1994] and ACEMOGLU 
[1997] for imperfect labor market competition.   2
is that, unless labor market frictions are absolute, general training raises the agent’s 
outside opportunities, which is not the case for specific training.   
However, we show that the lower willingness to invest in general training relative 
to specific training does not necessarily hold true if training has an information gathering 
role and if the gathered information about the agent’s skills is private to him and 
therefore creates an asymmetry of information.  Specific training allows the agent to learn 
his specific skills.  Similarly, general training allows the agent to learn his general skills.  
In addition, as general skills determine the agent’s outside opportunities, general training 
also allows the agent to learn his outside opportunities.  This information gathering role 
of training makes training beneficial for the principal because it allows for better 
matching between the workers and their job or work load.  The key assumption that 
differentiates our model from others is the information asymmetry between the principal 
and the agent.  If the agent privately learns his skills, training can be detrimental for the 
principal because the information asymmetry creates an incentive problem, hindering 
efficient matching.  Thus, the relative profitability between general and specific training 
depends on which training helps the principal to reduce the incentive problem. 
Regardless of whether it is general or specific skills, traditional incentive theory 
(e.g., LAFFONT AND TIROLE [1993]) has stressed the agent’s incentive to under-report his 
skills, which forces the principal to give the agent an information rent.  This is the 
incentive problem the principal faces when investing in training.  We show that the 
private information about outside opportunities, which is only relevant for general 
training, actually creates a force that counteracts the agent’s incentive to under-report 
because an agent who under-reports his general skills reduces his outside opportunities.  
If an agent with high general skills claims low general skills to obtain a rent from the 
principal, he will forgo the benefit of high outside opportunities.  This does not happen 
with specific skills since they do not affect outside opportunities.  An agent has therefore 
less incentive to under-report his general skills compared to specific skills, and the 
principal can reduce the agent’s information rent in the case of general training.   
Furthermore, we show that the amount of the reduction in information rent depends on 
the gap between the outside opportunities available to high skill agents and low skill 
agents, as identified by general training.   
Although the principal benefits from the reduction in information rents, there are 
costs associated with general training.  General training raises the agent’s general human 
capital and the principal must compensate the agent for his higher outside opportunities 
from general training.  Facing this trade-off, we show that the principal over-invests in 
general training relative to specific training if an improvement in the value of the agent’s 
outside opportunities is small relative to its gap between high and low skill agents.   
A straightforward empirical implication of our result is that we should expect to 
see more general training for new hires as it has an important information gathering role.  
There is indeed ample evidence that this is the case.  For example, the German 
apprenticeship fits our model well.  As ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE [2000, p.926] explain: 
“In the case of Germany, however, where workers enter apprenticeships at a relatively 
young age, like 15 or 16, it is unlikely that they have very good knowledge about all their 
own aptitudes and comparative advantages.”  LYNCH  [1992] studies the training for 
young workers and finds that the probability of investing in general training is lower if 
the youth has a longer tenure on the job.  The main form of general training given by the   3
U.S. Army forces is through the “Tuition Assistance Program” that allows new recruits to 
go to college (BUDDIN AND KAPUR [2005]). 
Our model differs from recent models of general training in several ways.  First, 
while we consider information asymmetry between the principal (employer) and the 
agent (worker), most of the literature (e.g., KATZ AND ZIDERMAN [1990] CHANG AND 
WANG [1996], and ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE [1998]) consider information asymmetry 
between incumbent and potential employers.  Second, we consider both general and 
specific skills whereas many models focus only on general skills.  With these critical 
differences, our paper is able to provide an additional justification for general training by 
emphasizing the information gathering role of training for new hires.  Furthermore, our 
analysis complements the prior studies by examining the relative profitability of general 
training focusing on frictions inside the firm (the agent’s incentive problem due to the 
acquisition of asymmetric information) in addition to frictions outside the firm. 
Our model is closely related to KESSLER AND LÜLFESMANN [2006] in that both 
consider general and specific trainings and adopt contractual approaches to reconcile 
firm-sponsored general training.  Their paper uncovers a complementarity between 
general and specific training investments as a result of the bargaining between the 
employer and employee after training. There are two main differences with our paper.  
First, we consider investment in general and specific training separately and therefore we 
do not incorporate the complementarity between the two types of training.  Second, 
instead of bargaining, we consider a screening contract that sort agents into their levels of 
skills.  With these differences, our model generates different empirical implications.  For 
instance, KESSLER AND LÜLFESMANN [2006] show that the presence of specific skills is 
necessary for investment in general training, so general training is more likely for 
workers with several years of tenure (i.e., workers with accumulated specific skills).  In 
contrast, our model suggests that general training is more likely for workers with little 
tenure such as new hires and apprentices.  For cross-firm implications, KESSLER AND 
LÜLFESSMAN [2006] argue that general training is more likely to be observed in large 
firms because more specific skills are put in place in such firms.  While our model may 
not generate an implication about firm size effects, it indicates that general training is 
more likely to be observed in firms with diverse workers’ general abilities because the 
reduction in information rents from training is larger for such firms.  
Furthermore, our model offers a testable prediction about the impact of training 
on skill premiums associated with asymmetric information.  A standard adverse selection 
model suggests that asymmetric information allows high skill agents to command rents, 
implying that skill premiums become greater under asymmetric information.  Our model 
shows that general training creates a force countering high skill agents’ incentive, which 
in turn reduces rents given to them.  This implies that in the presence of asymmetric 
information, skill premiums are small for firms investing in general training relative to 
firms investing in specific training.     
When comparing general training with specific training, LEWIS AND SAPPINGTON 
[1993] consider asymmetric information inside the firm like we do.  They examine a 
model where outside opportunities affect the training effort by the agent.  Versatile 
workers have private information about their outside opportunities that determine their 
wages, and have an incentive to overstate their outside opportunities.  As the optimal 
output is distorted upward in the presence of such a countervailing incentive, training for   4
versatile workers (general training) that increases the output adds another upward-
distortion.  General training becomes less attractive for the principal.  The main 
difference between their model and ours is that training in their model is just an 
investment in human capital, not an information gathering activity as the agent already 
knows his outside opportunities before training.  This results in under-investment in 
general training relative to specific training.       
While we focus on the application of our model to the training context, our paper 
also contributes to the literature on information gathering.  We extend the literature by 
studying how information about the agent’s outside opportunities affects the incentive of 
the firm to invest in information gathering.
3  The literature on information gathering is 
recent and still developing.  In CRÉMER AND KHALIL [1992], the agent’s information 
gathering is strategic,
4 which makes the principal not invest in information gathering. 
LEWIS AND SAPPINGTON [1997], and CRÉMER, KHALIL, AND ROCHET [1998a] consider 
productive information gathering like we do.  However, LEWIS AND SAPPINGTON [1997] 
assume that the principal always prefer information gathering to no information, which 
makes an analysis of investment in information gathering irrelevant. CRÉMER, KHALIL, 
AND ROCHET [1998a] analyze information gathering in terms of the agent’s information 
gathering cost.  However, unlike us, they do not consider the case where information 
gathering reveals the agent’s outside opportunities.  In the literature, it is usually the 
agent who decides whether to gather information.
5   An exception is LEWIS AND 
SAPPINGTON [1994].  In their model, the principal can endow the agent with private 
information similar to us.  However, information gathering is costless, and it does not 
affect the agent’s outside opportunities.   
Our paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present the basic model of 
training with information gathering.  In section 3, we analyze the effect of the 
identification of the agent’s skills and outside opportunities on the level of investment in 
training.  In section 4, we briefly discuss some extensions to the basic set-up.  It includes 
the cases where general and specific skills are correlated with each other, where the agent 
pays training costs, and where training affects the agent’s skills differently across the 
agent’s types.  We also introduce another application of our model to the context of R&D 
investment.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Model 
Skills and outside opportunities 
In a principal-agent framework, we present a model focusing on investment in 
training for new hires.
6  A principal hires an agent to carry out the production of a good 
(q ≥ 0) and gives him a transfer t for production.  The value of the product for the 
                                                 
3 Our model is also built upon the literature on countervailing incentives as the acquisition of private 
information about outside opportunities creates such incentives.  For countervailing incentives, see LEWIS 
AND S APPINGTON [1989a], [1989b], LAFFONT AND TIROLE [1989], JULLIEN [2000], and BONTEMS AND 
BOURGEON [2000].  This literature, however, does not consider the incentive to invest in information 
gathering. 
4 See also CRÉMER, KHALIL, AND ROCHET [1998b] for strategic information gathering. 
5 See also GEHRIG [2004] for the role of various organizational forms on information acquisition incentives. 
6 Our model can be applied to other frameworks involving information gathering.  See section 4.4 for an 
application of our model to R&D investment.   5
principal is given by V(q), where V(⋅) is increasing, concave, twice differentiable and 
satisfies the Inada conditions (V′(0) = ∞ and V′(∞) = 0).  The cost of production is borne 
by the agent and it is (β
G+β
S)q for producing q, with β
G and β
S being the cost parameters.  
We interpret the cost parameters as the skills of the agent.  Every agent has two types of 
skills: general and specific.  Accordingly, β
G and β
S capture general and specific skills, 
respectively. General skills can be productively used not only for the current employer 
but also for other employers.  Specific skills, on the other hand, are only useful to the 
current employer.  An agent with low cost parameters is a highly skilled or highly 
productive agent who incurs a small marginal cost of production.             
At the outset, neither the principal nor the agent knows the level of the agent’s 
skills.  Instead, they simply share the common belief that (i) β
G is 
G
H β  with probability 
G
H π  or 
G
L β  with probability 
G




L π =1, Δβ
G ≡ 
G
L β  –
G
H β  > 0); (ii) β
S is 
S
H β  with 
probability 
S
H π  or 
S
L β  with  probability 
S




L π  =  1,  Δβ
S  ≡ 
S
L β  –
S
H β  > 0).  For 
simplicity, we assume identical distributions such that  i π  ≡ 
G
i π  = 
S
i π , i = H, L.  We 
denote the (ex-ante) expected level of skills by
G β  ≡ 
G
H H π β  + 
G
LL π β and 
S β  ≡ 
S
H H π β  + 
S
LL π β .  In our base model, we assume that the skills are independent.  Our model is 
extended to the case of a positive correlation between general and specific skills in 
section 4.1.   
The value of the agent’s outside opportunities U is determined by his general 
skills so that an agent with high general skills (
G
H β ) has the high value of outside 
opportunities (UH).  Accordingly, as are general skills, the value of outside opportunities 
is unknown at the outset.  The principal and the agent share the common belief that U is 
UH with probability  H π  or UL with probability  L π  (ΔU ≡ UH –UL > 0), where the (ex-
ante) expected value of outside opportunities is given by U  ≡  H H U π  +  LL U π .  In contrast 
to general skills, the agent’s specific skills are only indirectly related to the value of 
outside opportunities through their relationship with general skills.  The assumption of 
zero correlation between general and specific skills in the base model implies that both 
agents with high and low specific skills have the value of outside opportunities equal to 
U  .  Training Program 
The principal sets up a training program for the agent.  Before engaging in 
production, the agent participates in the training program.  Training can be directed 
toward the agent’s general skills (it is then called general training) or toward his specific 
skills (it is then called specific training), but not both.  This distinction between the two 
types of training goes back to BECKER [1964].  We recognize that it is not always 
possible to distinguish between them since real world training often affects both types of 
skills simultaneously.
7   However, our simplifying assumption allows us to sharply 
contrast between general and specific trainings by separating the incentive effects of each 
type of training.   
Training for newly hired agents has an information gathering function.  It allows 
                                                 
7   Sometimes the distinction can be quite clear.  Pharmaceutical representatives generally attend 
motivational seminars to improve their sales abilities (general training) as well as lessons about the 
particular drugs sold by their company (specific training).   6
the agent to identify his skills.  The recent literature has stressed the role of skill 
identification in training.  It is, for instance, a central theme in AUTOR [2001]. Unlike 
training for senior agents who may already know their skills, training for newly hired 
junior agents provides them with an opportunity to learn their skills, productivity or 
ability.  We do not posit that without training, the agent would never identify his skills.  
The agent may learn his skills over the course of his tenure in the firm.  But our model is 
relevant if training expedites a learning process that would otherwise take years and may 
require the agent to move between many positions.  The information gathering role of 
training is essential since firms can then allocate tasks or work load efficiently according 
to the agents’ skills.  This identification process occurs in specific and general training.  
That is, general training allows the agent to identify his general skills (
G
H β  or 
G
L β ) and 
specific training allows the agent to identify his specific skills (
S
H β  or 
S
L β ).  The critical 
difference is that the agent can also identify his outside opportunities (UH or UL) from 
general training as general skills determine the agent’s outside opportunities.
8   The 
information gathered is private to the agent, so that no other parties know the agent’s 
skills.  If the information gathered is common knowledge, there is no incentive problem 
and the analysis is straightforward (see appendix).  
While the agent can identify the potential value of his outside opportunities from 
general training, he may not be able to collect this value when he moves to another firm 
because of labor market frictions.  Such frictions may be due to an information 
asymmetry between the principal and other potential employers when potential 
employers are not aware of the general training.
9   For instance, if potential employers do 
not observe whether general training took place,
10  they would offer a pooling wage 
contract to the agent based on U  .
11  In contrast, if potential employers do know that 
general training took place (but they still do not know the agent’s type as it is private 
                                                 
8 Our model assumes that the agent learns his skills perfectly.  Alternatively, we can allow for stochastic 
learning with the agent learning his skills only with some probability as in KESSLER [1998].  As long as the 
learning process is the same for general and specific trainings, stochastic learning would not qualitatively 
change our results that compare the two trainings.    
9 As ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE [1999] point out, the presence of labor market frictions is necessary for 
general training to be profitable for the principal.  Note that our focus is not on the profitability of general 
training per se, which is however necessary for us to investigate the relative profitability of general training 
to specific training.  Formally, one may introduce the agent’s turnover process and his interaction with 
potential employers to show how labor market frictions allow for profitable general training.  However, as 
we highlight the relative profitability of general training hinged on the frictions (information asymmetry) 
inside the firm, the formal modeling of the frictions outside the firm simply adds complexity to our model 
without generating new insights.  Accordingly, we just assume labor market frictions similar to ACEMOGLU 
AND P ISCHKE [1998] and let their results built in our model: labor market frictions prevent potential 
employers from discerning the identity of an agent who left the incumbent employer and therefore make 
them offer a pooling contract. 
10 If an employee can produce a certificate after undergoing general training, a high skill agent has an 
incentive to reveal this certificate to the potential employers to separate himself from low skill agents or 
untrained agents, and therefore the potential employer would know that such training took place.  However, 
current employers have no incentive to provide such a certificate as it would only help the agent leverage 
his new outside opportunities (see ACEMOGLU AND PISCHKE [2000] and HECKMAN, ROSELIUS, AND SMITH 
[1994]). 
11 Due to the unobservability, potential employers do not know whether or not the agent identifies the value 
of outside opportunities.  Formally, this is equivalent to the case where the principal (potential employers) 
faces possible ignorant agents.  As LEWIS AND SAPPINGTON [1993] show, pooling occurs in equilibrium.      7
information), it becomes common knowledge that the agent has identified the value of his 
outside opportunities, UH or UL, and a screening contract separating the high and low 
skill agents is optimal.  
To take such frictions into account in a simple way, the value of the agent’s 
outside opportunities he can collect after general training is formalized as γUi + (1–γ)U  , 
where  (0,1) γ ∈  and i = H, L.  We can interpret (1–γ) as the degree of labor market 
frictions hindering the relationship between the true potential value of the agent’s outside 
opportunities and the collectible value.  While market frictions prevent the agent from 
collecting the full value of his outside opportunities from potential employers, our focus 
is on the information revelation inside the firm.  One of our contributions is to analyze 
the asymmetry of the information acquired in the identification process of training 
between the principal and the agent. We assume that only the agent finds out the true 
value of his skills as it is the agent, not the principal, who participates in the training 
program.
 12   This asymmetry turns out to be critical in determining the principal’s 
incentive to invest in specific and general training.  To be clear, it should be noted that 
neither the principal nor the potential employers have information about the agent's type.  
However, the principal knows whether training takes place, while the potential employers 
only know it with probability γ.  In this respect, the potential employers are less informed 
than the incumbent employer for all γ < 1.  
In addition to the information gathering role of training, we also follow the 
standard assumption that training improves the agent’s skills.  We denote by α
G and α
S 
the improvement in general and specific skills due to training.  More specifically, an 
agent of type 
G
i β  (
S
i β ) sees his production costs reduced to 
G
i θ ≡ 
GG





i β α − ) after training.  To focus on the effects of the identification of innate skills 
(
G
i β and 
S
i β ), we assume that α
G and α
S  are constant over the agent’s type: 
GGG
HL α αα == and 
SSS
HL α αα ==.
13   Unlike AUTOR [2001], we do not need to assume 
that training is more productive in a marginal sense for agents with high skills.  What is 
required in our model is that an agent with high innate skills (
G
H β  or 
S
H β ) is still a high 
skill agent after training (
GG
H L θ θ >  and 
SS
H L θ θ > ).  In the case of general training, the 
value of the agent’s outside opportunities increases by K thanks to the accumulation of 
general human capital.
14  Again, due to labor market frictions, the agent is only able to 
collect γK.     
We assume that the principal bears training costs C up front.  We discuss the case 
where the agent pays for training later in section 4.2.  If the principal does not invest in 
training, the agent produces without knowing the cost parameters, and thus information 
                                                 
12  There is another asymmetric information case where only the principal finds out.  However, this 
informed principal case is not very interesting.  Since the principal’s payoff does not depend directly on the 
agent’s skills, there is no screening condition for the principal.  In other words, there is no profitable 
mechanism that induces a truthful revelation from the principal (See MASKIN AND TIROLE [1990], [1992]).  
13 As will be clear later, since α
G and α
S are inside efficiency parameters, there will be no change in our 
main result regarding the effect of outside opportunities on investment in training even if we allow for 
GG
H L α α ≠  and 
SS
H L α α ≠ .  See section 4.3 for further discussion. 
14 In our base model, K is type-independent (KH = KL = K).  We relax the assumption of constant K in 
section 4.3.   8
from the training is productive in the sense of CRÉMER, KHALIL, AND ROCHET [1998a].  
Note that since the cost parameters, β
G and β
S, represent the agent’s skills acquired before 
the contract, his ex-post utility depends on the true values of β
G and β
S no matter whether 
information gathering takes place or not.
15  We assume that the agent has the option of 
terminating his relationship with the principal at any time.  Technically, this assumption 
compels the principal to take account of the effect of information gathering on the agent’s 
outside opportunities.  
Timing 
The timing of the game is summarized as follows. At the outset, no one (the 
principal, the agent, and potential employers) knows the agent’s skills, but they share a 
common belief about β
G, β
S, and U.  The principal offers the agent a contract specifying 
the transfer t contingent on the output q and a training program for the agent.  General 
training reveals that the agent of expected type 
G β   is either type 
G
H θ  or 
G
L θ .  Similarly, 
specific training reveals that the agent of expected type 
S β   is either type 
S
H θ  or 
S
L θ .  If 
training is general, the agent can expect his outside opportunities to be valued either at 
γUH + (1–γ)U  + γK or at γUL + (1–γ)U  + γK depending on his type.  When there is 
specific training or no training, the value of the agent’s outside opportunities is simply U  .  
Finally, the agent engages in production. The output q and the transfer t are realized 
thereafter.
16   
 
Benchmark contracts 
The principal will invest in training only if it is profitable to do so and therefore 
compare her objective function with and without training.  We first present here the 
                                                 
15 Therefore, the agent’s true cost will eventually be revealed to him, but this information will come too late 
to affect the contract.  This is a standard assumption in the information gathering literature. 
16 Notice that standard training models including BECKER [1964] consider a two-period production: in the 
first period the agent participates in a training program and at the same time engages in production, and in 
the second period only production takes place.  This two-period production model allows an agent with 
credit constraints to pay for training by accepting lower wage for his first-period production.  Since we take 





S and U 
Contract is offered by 
the principal 
Training (general or 
specific) takes place 
Information about 
productivity and outside 
opportunities is revealed 
Production occurs, 
transfers are paid 
Figure 1: The timing of the game   9
optimal contract without training.  When the principal does not invest in training, the 
agent produces the output and receives a monetary transfer based on the expected level of 
skills (
GS β β +  ) and the expected value of outside opportunities (U  ).  The contract that 
maximizes the principal’s objective function (V(q)–t) subject to the agent’s participation 
constraint (t – (
GS β β +  )q ≥ U  ) gives the optimal output, denoted by q  , satisfying the 
first order condition  ()
GS Vq β β ′ =+   .   At the optimum, the value of the objective 
function is  
 () ( )
NT G S WV q q U ββ = −+ −    . (1) 
While relegating the details to the appendix, as a benchmark, we briefly discuss 
the principal’s incentive to invest in general training relative to specific training when 
training produces symmetric information (both the principal and the agent learn the 
agent’s skills).  To make a comparison between general and specific trainings, we 
consider a case where 
GS
ii β β =  and α
G = α
S for i = H, L.  The contract is now based on 
the true level of skills.  The value of the agent’s outside opportunities is also changed 
depending on whether training is directed toward general skills or specific skills.  As 
training, however, produces “symmetric” information, not surprisingly, the optimal 
output is the same for specific and general trainings.  Given that both trainings improve 
the inside productivity to the same amount (α
G = α
S), there is no reason to see the 
difference in the optimal output.  However, for the same output produced by the agent, 
the principal has to pay additional compensation to the agent to make up for γK in case of 
general training.  It makes the principal under-invest in general training relative to 
specific training.
17  In the extreme case where there are no labor market frictions (γ = 1), 
the agent is able to extract all the outside benefits of general training (K), and the 
principal may not invest at all in general training.
18    
3. Investment in general training relative to specific training 
The result of under-investment in general training relative to specific training may 
cease to be true if training produces asymmetric information, as we shall see in this 
section.  In what follows, we first characterize investment in specific training as the 
solution to a standard adverse selection problem.  Next, we derive the solution to the 
investment in general training and show the effect of outside opportunities as 
countervailing incentives.  We then compare the levels of investment in specific and 
general training by fully characterizing the solution to the investment in general training 
as a function of the gap between the outside opportunities of high and low skill agents.   
                                                 
17 Note that there are, at least, two well-known solutions to the problem of under-investment in general 
training.  The first one is to let the workers pay for general training.  We consider this case in section 4.2.  
However, training costs can be substantial and credit constrained workers may not be able to pay those 
costs up front.  Another solution is to let the firm recoup the training costs by paying the training worker 
less than his improved post-training marginal product in a long-term contract. In this model, we assume 
that firms and workers cannot commit to long-term wage contracts. 
18 This corresponds to Becker’s result that employers are less willing to pay for training that enhances 
outside opportunities for the workers.   10
Investment in specific training 
With specific training, the agent learns his specific skills, but not general skills or 
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Asymmetric information generates the traditional incentive for the agent with 
high specific skills to pretend to be a low skill agent in order to be assigned less arduous 
work or output.  To prevent misrepresenting, the agent must be given an information rent.   
The adverse selection created by training makes it uncertain whether training is a 
profitable investment for the principal.  The trade-off is between efficiency gains from 
both a reduction of marginal cost and a better match between each type and the output on 
the one hand, and a positive rent given to the agent with high specific-skills on the other 
hand.  Formally, the principal will invest in information gathering if the cost of 




S is the value of the objective 
function gross of C in this problem.  The principal’s maximum willingness to pay for 
specific training, C
S, can be derived explicitly: 
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S
i q  is defined as  ()
SG S






π β θβ ′ = ++Δ  .  The first two 
terms of the above expression represent the efficiency gains from both a reduction of 
marginal cost and a better match while the last term is the rent to the high skill agent.
19 
Investment in general training 
With general training, instead of expecting U ~  as outside opportunity, the agent 
knows that his outside opportunities are valued at γUH + (1–γ)U  + γK if he is an agent 
with high general skills and γUL + (1–γ)U  + γK if he is an agent with low general skills.  
The principal’s problem can be stated as 
                                                 
19 We follow a typical assumption in the literature on information gathering that there is an efficiency gain 
from identification, i.e., even if α
S = 0 and thereby 
SS
ii θβ = ,  C
S  > 0 (see, for example, LEWIS AND 
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Once he has identified higher outside opportunities, the agent with high general 
skills can now expect a higher transfer.  This discourages him from pretending to be an 
agent with low general skills.  In other words, the identification of outside opportunities 
generates a force that counteracts the traditional incentive for the high skill agent,
20 and 
allows the principal to ease the output distortion.  However, if the gap between the 
outside opportunities of the high and low skill agents (ΔU) is large, the agent with low 
general skills develops an incentive to pretend to be an agent with high general skills.  
The principal gives a rent to the agent with low general skills and distorts the output for 
the agent with high general skills upward, in order to dissuade the agent with low general 
skills from pretending to be an agent with high general skills.  
As the optimal contract varies with ΔU,
21 the principal’s maximum willingness to 
pay for general training, denoted by CG, also varies with ΔU.  We compute this formally 
in the appendix.  
General training vs. specific training 
We are now in a position to analyze the principal’s incentive to invest in general 
training relative to specific training.  Again, to make a comparison between general and 
specific trainings, we consider a case where 
GS
iii β ββ = ≡  and α
G = α
S ≡ α for i = H, L. 
That is, a priori general and specific skills have the same effects on the inside 
productivity.  The question is then whether CG is greater or less than CS in (2).  The 
answer depends on the gap between the outside opportunities of the high and low general 
skill agents (ΔU) relative to the improvement in the value of the agent’s outside 
opportunities from general training (K) as summarized in the following proposition.   
Proposition 1 For  (0,1) γ ∈  and 
* 1
H UU q β
γ
Δ< Δ≡Δ , the principal always over-invests 
                                                 
20  There are other forces identified in the literature such as career concerns and promotion that can 
counteract the agent’s traditional incentive to shirk.  In a moral hazard framework, DEWATRIPONT, JEWITT 
AND TIROLE [1999], who generalize the original contribution by HOLMSTRÖM [1982], show in the presence 
of career concerns that the agent would exert effort or take arduous tasks even without an explicit incentive. 
Similarly, LAZEAR AND ROSEN [1981] show that a tournament competition for promotion makes the agent 
exert first-best effort.  Formally, career concerns and promotion have similar effects on the agent’s 
incentive as general training because all of them affect the RHS of the individual rationality constraint, 
which defines the agent’s current outside opportunities, future expected opportunities, job tenure or option 
values depending on the modeling choice.  If we model both adverse selection and career concerns for 
instance, the agent’s incentive may not be uniquely characterized in equilibrium as signaling becomes a 
relevant issue.  Nevertheless, unless career concerns nullify the traditional incentive, general training helps 
counteract the traditional incentive.  
21 See LEWIS AND SAPPINGTON [1989a] and JULLIEN [2000] for an optimal contract with countervailing 
incentives in general.    12
in general training relative to specific training for small values of K ( H KK U π <≡Δ ).  
For larger values of K, over-investment may still occur as long as K is not too large 
(KK < , whereKK >  ). 
  The proof and the definition of K are in the appendix.  
*
H q  is the first-best level of 
output defined by 
* () HH Vq θ β ′ =+  .  We first interpret the proposition and then offer 
some intuition.  The first part of the proposition considers the case where the gap between 
the outside opportunities of high and low skill agents is not too large ( UU Δ< Δ) and 
identifies the condition under which general training is more profitable for any given 
level of market frictions  (0,1) γ ∈ .  It shows that general training is more profitable for 
the principal than specific training for small improvements in the (after training) value of 
the agent’s outside opportunities from general training ( KK < ).  Notice that K  is a 
fraction of ΔU ( H KU π ≡Δ ), implying that general training is more profitable than 
specific training for small K relative to ΔU (K < ΔU <  U Δ ).   
To understand the intuition behind the proposition, suppose first that K = 0.   
General training allows each type of the agent to identify the value of his outside 
opportunities, but does not increase it.  If ΔU is small, the agent with high general skills 
still has an incentive to pretend to be a low general skill agent as in the case of specific 
training.  However, since a low skill agent’s outside opportunities are valued at a lower 
level after general training, pretending to be a low skill agent is not as attractive as in the 
case of specific training.  It implies that disciplining the high skill agent’s incentive 
becomes easier for the principal.  In particular, the principal can reduce the information 
rent given to the high skill agent by  γ∆U compared to the case of specific training, 
making general training more profitable than specific training.  However, if K > 0, the 
principal has to increase compensation for both types of the agent by γK.  Then, general 
training is more profitable only if γK < πH γ∆U, which is the reduction of the expected 
information rent.  Of course, this result is valid for small ΔU.  If ΔU is large so that the 
agent with low general skills develops an incentive to pretend to be an agent with high 
general skills, the principal faces a new incentive problem, making general training less 
profitable than specific training.   
The second part of the proposition shows that general training can still be more 
profitable than specific training for K larger than K (i.e., KK > ).  If ΔU is small, in 
addition to the reduction of the information rent given to the agent with high general 
skills, there is another gain from general training relative to specific training. Recall that 
the principal uses output distortion as well as the provision of rents when disciplining the 
agent’s traditional incentive.  With general training, the principal can ease output 
distortion since disciplining the high skill agent’s incentive becomes easier.  Depending 
on the magnitude of this additional benefit, general training can be more profitable for K 
larger than K .   
Notice that two necessary conditions for general training to be more profitable 
than specific training ( UU Δ< Δ and  KK < ) depend on labor market frictions.  In 
particular, greater frictions (smaller γ) make  U Δ  and K  larger (see the definition of K  
in the appendix), relaxing the conditions.  Labor market frictions help general training to   13
be more profitable since the principal makes up only for a fraction of K, which decreases 
with the degree of labor market frictions γ, after general training.    
Finally, other than the fact that an agent with high (low) general skills has the 
high (low) value of outside opportunities, we did not impose a specific relationship 
between the level of general skills and the value of outside opportunities.  In particular, 
ΔU can have any values independent of those of Δβ.  A special case would be when the 
difference in the outside opportunities between high and low skill agents is closely 
related to rent inside the firm.  It implies that ΔU ≈ Δβ·q.  If this is the case, the condition 
* 1
H UU q γ β Δ< Δ≡Δ  is likely to be met because γ < 1, and therefore the real binding 
condition depends on K only.  
To summarize: because general training creates a force that counteracts the 
agent’s traditional incentive of under-reporting his type, the principal can lessen the 
incentive problems and reduce the agent’s rent.  However, general training is costly to the 
principal since she has to compensate the agent for an increase in the value of his outside 
opportunities from general training.  If the principal’s gain from lessening incentive 
problems is larger than this cost, general training can be more profitable than specific 
training. 
4. Extensions 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to the cases where 
general and specific skills are positively correlated with each other, where the agent pays 
training costs, and where the (inside and outside) value of training is type-contingent.  
We also offer another application of our model in a different context.  
4.1. Positive correlation between general and specific skills 
When general and specific skills are correlated, even investment in specific 
training may reveal information about the agent’s outside opportunities.  A question then 
arises as to whether the result of over-investment in general training relative to specific 
training is robust to the introduction of a correlation between general and specific skills.  
If the correlation is perfect, there would no longer be any over-investment in general 
training relative to specific training because specific training becomes de facto general 
training.  We show in this section that over-investment in general training relative to 
specific training remains as long as the correlation is not perfect.   
To model the correlation between general and specific skills, we define 
conditional probabilities as πii ≡ (|)
SG
ii prob β β = ( | )
GS
ii prob β β = δ + (1–δ) πi and πji 
≡ (|)
SG
ji prob β β =  (|)
GS
ji prob β β = (1–δ) πj, where  (0,1) δ ∈ and { , } ijH L ≠ ∈ .
22  δ can 
represent the degree at which general and specific skills are correlated with each other.
23  
                                                 
22 Formally, the correlation between general and specific skills can be derived from joint probabilities of 
general and specific skills.  However, what is required in our analysis is conditional probabilities in that an 
agent is more likely to have high specific skills given that he is an agent with high general skills, and vice 
versa. 
23 δ being zero implies that conditional probabilities become equivalent to unconditional probabilities (πii = 
πi and πji = πj). πii increases whereas πji decreases as δ increases from zero, and finally they become 1 and 0 
when δ = 1, respectively.     14
An imperfect but positive correlation between general and specific skills implies that πii > 
πi and πji < πj for all i ≠ j.  With this positive correlation, the following proposition 
characterizes the condition under which over-investment in general training relative to 
specific training occurs. 
Proposition 2  For  (0,1) δ ∈ ,  (0,1) γ ∈ , and  UU
δ
Δ< Δ , the principal always over-
invests in general training relative to specific training if KK







and  (1 ) H KU
δ δπ =− Δ. 
The proof is in the appendix.  
1





π θ ββ ′ = ++ Δ  .  The 
proposition shows that regardless of labor market frictions and correlations between 
general and specific trainings, general training is more profitable for the principal than 
specific training for small K relative to ∆U.  Labor market frictions help the principal to 
over-invest in general training relative to specific training as they ease the condition for 
general training to be more profitable ( UU
δ
Δ< Δ ).  An increase in the correlation δ 
reduces  K
δ , implying that general training becomes relatively less profitable with a 
higher correlation between general and specific trainings.  In short, although general 
training becomes less attractive to the principal if there is a correlation between general 
and specific skills, it is still more profitable than specific training for small K relative to 
∆U.  The result of over-investment in general training relative to specific training is 
therefore robust to the introduction of the correlation. 
We can offer the intuition behind the results as follows.  Given that ∆U is small, 
both general and specific trainings lessen the agent’s incentive problems.  In particular, 
the high (general or specific) skill agent’s incentive to pretend to be a low skill agent is 
weakened since by doing so he would be compensated based on a lower value of outside 
opportunities.  The principal can thus reduce the information rent given to the high skill 
agent.  As is well-known, the information rent given to the high skill agent is proportional 
to the compensation for the low skill agent and thereby to the value of the low skill 
agent’s outside opportunities, which is γUL + (1–γ)U  + γK in case of general training, 
γ[δUi + (1–δ)U  ] + (1–γ)U  = δγUL + (1–δγ)U   in case of specific training, and U   in case 
of no training.  Both general and specific trainings reduce the information rent, and 
general training reduces it more than specific training does, making general training more 
profitable.  However, the principal pays an extra cost of γK when investing in general 
training.  This trade-off implies that general training is more profitable than specific 
training if K < (1–δ)πH∆U.  Of course, a higher correlation between general and specific 
skills lowers the relative benefit of general training associated with rent reduction.   
4.2. Training costs paid by agents 
We have assumed so far that the principal pays training costs up front and that the 
agent has to participate in the training program regardless of his willingness to do so.  In 
this section, we explore an alternative possibility where the agent pays training costs, and   15
only participates in the training program if it is profitable for him to do so.
24  Because our 
focus is not on the effects of the agent’s credit constraints, we assume that the agent can 
access the fund for training costs without constraints.  
  Since the principal does not directly pay training costs, she must induce the agent 
to pay C and participate in the training program if it is profitable for her.  Thus the 
principal has to face the following training participation constraint in addition to the 
contract participation constraint (IR) and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) if 
training is directed toward specific skills: 
  () ( ) () ()
GS GS
HH HH LL LL tq t q U C πβ θπ β θ −+ + −+ − ≥   , (3) 
and if training is directed toward general skills:
25  
  () ( ) () ()
GS GS
HH H H LL L L tq tq U C πθ βπ θ β −+ + −+ − ≥   . (4) 
If the agent participates in the training program, he will receive his transfer according to 
his skills and therefore his expected payoff is the first two terms in the LHS of the 
constraints.  If he does not participate in the program, his skills are not identified and 
therefore receives the payoff that is just equivalent to his expected outside opportunities 
U ~ .  To induce the agent to participate in the training program, the principal has to 
guarantee that the agent’s gain from training (the LHS of the constraints) is larger than 
the cost of training C.  
  We can use the model of section 3 to examine how our solutions may be affected.  
Consider first specific training.  Recall that the high skill agent is able to earn a rent due 
to the traditional incentive from private information.  This makes the LHS of (3) positive.  
Thus, for small C, given that the principal offers the contract characterized in section 3, 
the agent voluntarily participates in the training program and pays C by himself, which is 
compensated by the rent he will later enjoy.  However, for larger C, the training 
participation constraint would be violated.  The principal has to pay some of the training 
costs by increasing the expected transfer to the agent (πLtL + πHtH).   
Consider next general training.  Depending on the size of ΔU, the agent may or 
may not earn a rent.  However, the LHS of (4) is always positive since the principal has 
to compensate the agent for γK even if she does not have to surrender a rent.  Thus, a 
similar result would be expected: for small C the agent pays all of the training costs, 
while for large C the principal pays some of the training costs.  Since the effect of the 
training participation constraint is qualitatively the same for both specific and general 
trainings, the comparison of the level of investment in general training to specific training 
                                                 
24 See WASMER [2006] that models the agent’s incentive to invest in specific skills relative to general skills.  
In general, workers are more willing to invest in general skills than specific skills because of the exactly 
opposite reason why firms are less willing to invest in general skills. He investigates the conditions under 
which workers are more willing to invest in specific training.  In a general equilibrium model with search 
frictions, he shows that workers invest more in specific skills relative to general skills when job matching is 
less efficient and when employment protection is high.  
25 In our model, the principal decides whether the training program is general or specific.  Since our goal is 
to compare the relative profitability of the two types of training we do not consider a third option: investing 
in both general and specific training.  Under such alternative assumption, the agent would need to 
determine not only his participation but also in which training program to join in, which would require 
additional constraints.          16
would be identical to the one in section 3. 
To summarize: compared to the model in section 3, training is more attractive to 
the principal since she does not have to pay all of training costs.  However, she has to pay 
some of the training costs if they become large.  No matter who pays training costs, our 
main findings about the over-investment in general training relative to specific training 
remain.   
4.3. Type contingent value of training 
So far we have assumed that not only the “inside” value of training (α) but also 
the “outside” value of general training (K) are constant over the types.  We relax these 
assumptions in this section and confirm the robustness of our results.  
Let us first consider type-contingent values for α (i.e., αH ≠  αL).  Since training 
now affects the difference between the agent’s marginal costs, a new effect arises.   
Suppose that training benefits more the high skill agent: αH > αL.  A direct consequence 
of training is to increase the gap between the marginal costs of the low and high skill 
agents.  Training increases the informational rent of the high skill agent and less 
investment will occur, compared to a case where αH = αL.  Conversely, if αH < αL, more 
investment will occur. 
Notice that α was assumed to be the same for both general and specific skills for a 
comparison purpose (α
G = α
S), so it does not affect the relative profitability of general 
training to specific training no matter whether it is type-contingent or independent.   
However, the focus of this paper is on the incentive effects of a change in outside 
opportunities on the level of investment in training.  Therefore, it is more relevant to 
examine how type contingent values for K (i.e., KH ≠ KL) affect our results, putting aside 
type-contingent values for α.   
We will start with the more natural case where KH > KL (with ΔK ≡ KH – KL > 0).  
This is the case where a high skill agent increases his outside opportunities relatively 
more with general training.  For a comparison purpose, it is assumed that K = πHKH + 
πLKL.  The difference between the high skill agent’s and the low skill agent’s outside 
opportunities is now ΔU + ΔK.  The benefit to the principal of general training associated 
with rent reduction then depends on ΔU + ΔK instead of ΔU alone, and the principal 
always over-invests in general training relative to specific training for K < πH(ΔU+ΔK).  
Compared to the case of constant K, general training is more profitable than specific 
training for greater values of K.  The outside opportunities of the agent with low general 
skills were γUL + (1–γ)U   + γK, but they are now γUL + (1–γ)U   + γKL when K is type-
contingent.  Given that K > KL, disciplining the high skill agent’s incentive to pretend to 
be a low skill agent becomes easier. 
In contrast, if KH < KL so that ΔK < 0, general training becomes less attractive.  
However, our main result still remains.  As long as the outside (after training) value of a 
high skill agent is greater than that of a low skill agent (i.e., ΔU+ΔK > 0), general training 
is more profitable than specific training for small K relative to ΔU+ΔK.     
4.4. Investment in R&D 
Our model and findings can also be applied to other areas such as investment in   17
R&D.  Consider for instance a firm that invests in research to improve and develop 
projects.  As a result of R&D investment, a researcher (the agent) acquires a new 
technology or project idea, which enhances efficiency inside the firm (α).  A successful 
result of R&D investment is likely to be related with the researcher’s ability. Thus, at the 
time R&D investment takes place, the researcher learns his ability (β).  Just like 
investment in training, investment in R&D also has dual roles: it increases inside 
efficiency and identifies the researcher’s ability.   
The researcher with high ability may expect better outside opportunities (UH > 
UL) if the technology or the project idea the researcher developed is general rather than 
firm-specific.  In addition, the researcher may have new outside opportunities (K).  For 
instance, he could walk away with the technology or project idea and develop it 
elsewhere as argued in ANTON AND YAO [1995] and ANAND AND GALETOVIC [2000].  
The size of new outside opportunities depends on not only the outside value of the result 
of R&D investment but also how well property right is defined on it. 
Our model of investment in information gathering produces a conventional 
prediction regarding the effect of property right on investment in R&D.
26 If property 
rights on the result of research are weak (large K), the benefit from easing incentive 
problems through general R&D investment is not enough to offset the negative effect of 
the outflow of research results.  It leads to under-investment in general R&D investment 
relative to firm specific R&D investment.  If property rights are strong (small K), the 
benefit of lessening incentive problems through general R&D investment can dominate.  
Then, there may be over-investment in general R&D.   
5. Conclusion 
Our model studied an important effect of the identification of outside 
opportunities on investment in information gathering.  This effect has unexpected 
consequences when information revelation is asymmetric: it generates over-investment in 
information gathering relative to the case where information gathering does not identify 
the agent’s outside opportunities.   
We presented an application of our model to investment in general training for 
new hires.  We showed that an employer may over-invest in general training relative to 
specific training.  Becker’s traditional result of under-investment in general training may 
not hold when training creates asymmetric information.  The identification of an agent’s 
outside opportunities from general training lessens the incentive problems inside the firm.  
This is a novel justification of the evidence reported in the introduction that employers 
sponsor general training particularly for young workers, new hires and apprentices.  Our 
explanation relies on incentives inside the firm.  Except for the paper by KESSLER AND 
LÜLFESMANN [2006] so far the literature had only stressed causes outside the firm such 
as labor market frictions.  
Our model offers a few interesting policy implications.  As is well-known, the 
presence of information asymmetry in economic trades results in sub-optimal outcome 
and thereby is welfare-decreasing.  Thus policies that reduce the information gap such as 
monitoring, auditing, certification, and others are recommended in many instances.     
However, in the context of general training, our model shows that the elimination of 
                                                 
26 See AGHION AND TIROLE [1994] for optimal allocation of property rights on the result of research.   18
information asymmetry may make general training less likely.  In the case where 
information asymmetry disappears because of the firm’s learning by doing or other 
natural reasons (for example the case of senior workers), training subsidies would help 
employers to sponsor general training.        19
Appendix 
Investment in training under symmetric information 
With specific training that produces symmetric information, the contract is based 
on 
S
i θ , 
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The optimal contract requires the ex-post first-best level of output, denoted by 
* S
i q , for each type of skill: 
* ()
SG S
ii Vq β θ ′ = +  , i = H, L.  The transfer given to the agent is 
* ()
GS S
ii i tq U βθ =+ +   , i = H, L.  Therefore, at the optimum, the value of the objective 
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Clearly, the principal can be better off by investing in specific training (C
S > 0).  This is 
due to both the information gathering and the human capital functions of training.   
Next, when the principal invests in general training, the contract is now based on 
G
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Both types of the agent still produce at the first best: 
* ()
GG S
ii Vq θ β ′ =+  , i = H, L.  
But investment in training is affected as it now depends on γK.  Labeling the optimal 
value of the objective function gross of C as W
G
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If
GS
iii β ββ =≡  and 
GS α αα =≡ , it must be that 
GS
iii θ θθ = ≡  and 
GS β ββ =≡  , 
implying that  
** * SG
iii qqq =≡ .  From (A2) and (A3), it is then clear that the principal 
under-invests in general training relative to specific training (
GS CC < ). 
Proof of proposition 1   
LAFFONT AND TIROLE [1989] and LAFFONT AND MARTIMORT [2002] show that 
in the case of type-contingent outside opportunities, the optimal contract has five 
different regimes depending on the size of ΔU.   We first summarize the optimal outputs 
of each regime.   
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Here  1 H λ π ≤  is the multiplier for the (ICH) constraint, and   2 L λ π ≤  is the multiplier for 
the (ICL) constraint.  Thus,  
12345* GGGG GG
LLLL LL qqqqqq ≤≤==≡ 
*12345 GGGGGG
HHHHHH qqqqqq ≡==≤≤. 
The principal’s maximum willingness to pay for general training, 
G
r C , r = 1, …, 5, 
is 
GN T
r WW − , where 
G
r W  is the value of the objective function gross of C at regime r 
when investment in general training takes place while 
NT W  is the value of the objective 
function when no investment takes place.  Thus, 
G
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With symmetric conditions, 
GS
iii β ββ = ≡  and 
GS α αα = ≡ , it must be that 
GS
iii θ θθ =≡, 
GS β ββ =≡  , and 
GS β ββ Δ =Δ ≡Δ . It is then easy to see that 
1* * SG G
LL L L qq q q =≤≡  and 
** SG
H HH qq q =≡ .   
Next, we define the following useful expression.   
() ( ) () , , ii i i Yq Vq q i HL θβ ≡− + =  . 
Since  () V ⋅  is concave and () ii q θβ +   is linear in qi, Y(qi) has an unique maximum at 
*
ii qq = , and it is monotonically decreasing as qi goes away from 
*
i q .  It implies that 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*21 * 45 ,
GGS GG
LL L LHH H Yq Yq Yq Yq Yq Yq Yq ≥≥= ≥≥, (A4)   
since 
*21 GGS
LL L L qq q q ≥≥=  and 
*4 5 GG
H HH qq q ≤≤.   
Now we are ready to compare 
G
r C , r=1,…,5, with 
S C .   
1
GS
H CC UK π γγ −=Δ − 
2
2 ()( )
GS G S S




LL L H L C C Yq Yq q K π πβ γ ⎡⎤ −= − + Δ − ⎣⎦  
*4 *
4 () ( ) () ()
GS G S S
HH H LL L H L C C Yq Yq Yq Yq q K π ππ β γ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − − + − + Δ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
*5 * 5
5 () ( ) () ()
GS G S S G
HH H LL L H L L H L C C Yq Yq Yq Yq q q U K π ππ β π β π γ γ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − − + − + Δ + Δ −Δ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
where all of the expressions in [ ] are non-negative from (A4).  Notice that if K = 0, 
1
GS CC > ,  2
GS CC > , and  3
GS CC > .  However,  4
G C  and  5
G C  may or may not greater than 
S C .  Thus, we can find sufficient conditions associated with K that allow 
G C  to be 
greater than 
S C  if 
* 1
H UU q β
γ
Δ< Δ≡Δ  (from regime 1 to regime 3).  In particular,    
1
GS CC >  if  H KK U π < ≡Δ  
2
GS CC >  if  { }
2 1 ˆ ()( )
GS S
LL L H L KK Y q Y q q ππ β
γ
⎡⎤ <≡ − +Δ ⎣⎦  
3




LL L H L KK Y q Y q q ππ β
γ





Δ<Δ   in regime 1,  ˆ KKK < < .  Thus, given that  UU Δ< Δ, 
G C  is 
always greater than 
S C  if KK < , and  
S C  can be greater than 
S C  if KK < .      ■ 
Proof of proposition 2   
Given that there is a positive correlation between general and specific skills, the 
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Similar to the one shown in the proof of proposition 1, the solution to this problem is 
summarized as:  
 





Δ< Δ  
11 () ,()
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β θβ β θ
π
′′ = ++ Δ = +   
II 
13 11 SS SS
L L qU q ββ
δγ δγ
Δ< Δ < Δ 
22 1 () ,()
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β θβ β θ
π
′′ = ++Δ = +   
III 
33 11 SS SS
L H qU q ββ
δγ δγ
Δ< Δ < Δ  33 () ,()
SG SSG S
LL LHH H Vq Vq β θβ θ ′′ = += +   
IV 
35 11 SS SS
H H qU q ββ
δγ δγ
Δ< Δ < Δ 
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Δ> Δ  
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β θβ θ β
π
′′ = += + − Δ   
 
Here  1 H λ π ≤   is the multiplier for the (ICH) constraint, and   2 L λ π ≤   is the multiplier 
forthe (ICL) constraint. 
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Notice that this problem and its solution are virtually the same as the ones in the case 
where δ = 0, except that specific skills are now 
S
i β   instead of 
S β  .   
With symmetric conditions, 
GS
iii β ββ = ≡  and 
GS α αα = ≡ , it must be that   23
GS
iii θ θθ =≡ , 
GS β ββ = ≡  , and 
GS β ββ Δ =Δ ≡Δ .  It is then easy to see that 
Sr Gr r
iii qqq =≡ , i = H, L, and r = 1, …, 5.  Using these solutions, we can calculate the 
principal’s maximum willingness to pay for specific and general trainings, 
S
r C  and 
G
r C , r 
= 1, …, 5, as shown in the proof of proposition 1.  Notice that the region of each regime 




Δ<Δ , the optimal contract in both specific and general training cases are in 
regime 1, and  
11 (1 )
GS







Δ< Δ ≡Δ , the above comparisons imply that  11
GS CC >  if 
(1 ) H KK U
δ δπ <≡ − Δ .      ■ 
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